CRA Firmware Evidence: Scope, Dates and Preparation
Practical breakdown of the EU Cyber Resilience Act requirements for embedded firmware teams, covering technical obligations, SBOM requirements, vulnerability handling, and the evidence pack needed for compliance.

The EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) imposes cybersecurity requirements on products with digital elements sold in the European market. For embedded firmware teams, this is engineering work, not a compliance checkbox exercise. The regulation requires demonstrable security practices, documented vulnerability handling, and technical evidence that covers the full product lifecycle. This guide translates those obligations into concrete tasks.
What the CRA requires (simplified)
Determine whether the product is within the CRA scope and whether an exclusion or other sector legislation applies. Record the legal role of each organisation before assigning obligations. Requirements fall into three categories:
- Security by design: The product must be designed with appropriate cybersecurity measures
- Vulnerability handling: The manufacturer must have a process for handling vulnerabilities throughout the product's support period
- Technical documentation: The manufacturer must maintain documentation demonstrating compliance
Document the expected period of use and the support-period assessment. Article 13 generally sets at least five years, with an exception for products expected to be used for less than five years.
Engineering tasks
Secure development lifecycle
The CRA expects a documented secure development process. For embedded firmware, that starts with threat modelling: identifying every attack surface (network interfaces, debug ports, update mechanisms, physical access) and documenting how each is addressed. It extends to secure coding practices - static analysis, structured code review, adherence to CERT C or MISRA standards where applicable - and to dependency management, which means tracking all third-party components with versions, licenses, and current vulnerability status.
The SLSA build provenance guide covers how to produce evidence that your build process is controlled and auditable.
SBOM generation
Annex I Part II requires component and vulnerability documentation, including an SBOM in a commonly used machine-readable format covering at least top-level dependencies. Prepare a per-release inventory and verify its correspondence with the shipped image. The following are useful evidence fields; the format and recipient can impose additional requirements:
- Component identity and version
- Dependency relationships and coverage limits
- Supplier and source information
- Licence metadata used by the product review
- Image digest and build revision
The firmware SBOM guide covers SBOM generation in SPDX and CycloneDX formats.
Vulnerability handling
Manufacturer reporting applies from 11 September 2026. The Commission describes a 24-hour early warning and a 72-hour notification, with subsequent deadlines depending on whether the case concerns an actively exploited vulnerability or a severe incident. Open-source software stewards have separate Article 24 obligations applying from 11 December 2027. Record the responsible role, trigger and reporting owner. Commission reporting guidance.
The engineering implications are specific. You need automated CVE monitoring against your SBOM (Yocto's cve-check, Grype, or similar tools), an OTA update mechanism capable of deploying security patches - the OTA updates guide covers the technical options - VEX document generation to communicate "not affected" status and keep false positives from creating unnecessary noise, and an internal triage-to-release process with documented timelines.
Secure default configuration
Apply the relevant Annex I requirements using the product risk assessment. Review secure defaults, access control, exposed services, update controls and protection of stored data. Document any exception and its legal and technical basis rather than treating a generic checklist as the requirement for every product.
For embedded Linux, that translates to a minimal rootfs containing only required packages, firewall rules enabled from first boot, debug interfaces (UART, JTAG) disabled or authenticated in production builds, and an enforced secure boot chain with explicitly documented coverage.
Logging and monitoring
Assess the applicable security-monitoring requirements and user controls against the product risk assessment. Relevant embedded-device records can include:
- Boot integrity status logging
- Authentication attempt logging
- Network connection logging
- Firmware update success/failure logging
Storage constraints on embedded devices make comprehensive logging challenging. Prioritize high-value events and consider log forwarding to a central server.
The evidence pack
The CRA requires maintaining technical documentation. Organise it as an "evidence pack" that covers:
1. Product description
- Hardware platform and SoC
- Software components and architecture diagram
- Network interfaces and protocols
- Update mechanism description
2. Risk assessment
- Threat model document
- Attack surface analysis
- Risk mitigation measures and their implementation evidence
3. SBOM
- Per-release SBOM in a versioned machine-readable format supported by the receiving workflow
- Component version history across releases
4. Build evidence
- SLSA provenance documents for each release
- Build system description (Yocto version, toolchain, configuration)
- Reproducibility evidence (can you reproduce the build from the provenance?)
5. Vulnerability handling records
- CVE monitoring configuration and coverage
- Triage records for each relevant CVE
- VEX documents for "not affected" determinations
- Patch timeline records (time from CVE awareness to fix release)
6. Test evidence
- Security test results (SAST, DAST, fuzz testing)
- Penetration test reports (if applicable)
- Boot integrity test results
- Update mechanism test results
Timeline and categories
General products, important products and critical products have different conformity-assessment routes. Annex III divides important products into Class I and Class II. Class I is not the name of the default category. Critical products are addressed separately in Annex IV and Article 8. Determine classification from the product's actual functionality and applicable provisions.
The main application date is 11 December 2027. Manufacturer reporting under Article 14 applies from 11 September 2026. Document which provisions apply to the organisation and product, including the distinct open-source steward role. An evidence organiser helps retain records but cannot establish conformity or settle classification. Regulation (EU) 2024/2847.
Connecting engineering evidence
Inspect which artifacts your actual build produces. Map package inventory, source revisions, patches, test logs and update evidence to the same firmware release. Record missing outputs as work to complete. The packaging documentation and specifications provide project context.
Retain decisions with a named responsible role, review date and evidence reference. Source availability, an SBOM or a provenance statement alone cannot establish that every applicable product obligation has been met.
Starting point
Establish scope and organisational role, then map the product's evidence and reporting workflow to the applicable provisions. Record unresolved classification and support-period questions for qualified review. Keep technical logs, vulnerability decisions and release artifacts versioned so the people responsible can reconstruct what was known and shipped.